A group encryption scheme allows anyone to form a ciphertext for a given group member while keeping the receiver's identity private. At the same time, the encryptor is capable of proving that some (anonymous) group member is able to decrypt the ciphertext and, optionally, that the corresponding plaintext satisfies some a priori relation (to prevent sending bogus messages). Finally, in case of a dispute, the identity of the intended receiver can be recovered by a designated authority. In this paper, we abstract a generic approach to construct group encryption schemes. We also introduce several new implementation tricks. As a result, we obtain group encryption schemes that significantly improve the state of the art. Both interactive and non-interactive constructions are considered.
Introduction
Basically, group signature schemes [13] allow a registered group member to conceal her identity when issuing digital signatures. However, any group signature can be opened by a designated group authority to reveal the signature's originator. In a dual way, group encryption schemes [23] provide revocable anonymity to the ciphertext's receiver. More specifically, a group encryption scheme is a public-key encryption scheme augmented with special properties: (1) the receiver's identity is hidden among the set of group members, (2) an opening authority is able to uncover the receiver's identity if need be, and (3) the ciphertext's originator is able to convince a verifier that (3-a) the ciphertext can be decrypted by a group member, (3-b) the opening authority can open the ciphertext and revoke the anonymity, and (3-c) the corresponding plaintext satisfies some a priori relation.
The additional features enjoyed by group encryption schemes make them suitable for a number of privacy-aware applications. One of them resides in secure oblivious retriever storage where anonymous credentials may move between computing elements (computer, mobile unit, etc...). Asynchronous transfer, which does not require the presence of all devices (subject to the transfer) at the same time, may resort to an untrusted server for storing temporarily the encrypted credentials. Group encryption can be employed in implementing such a storage server where it is guaranteed that (1) the server stores well formed encrypted credentials; (2) the credentials have a legitimate anonymous retriever; (3) if necessary, an authority is able to pin down the identity of the retriever.
Further scenarios where group encryption can be utilized are described in [23, 12] . It is worth noting that when the opening functionality is not needed in these applications, one can thrive on a closely related primitive titled ring encryption [25] .
Related work The concept of group encryption was first formalized by Kiayias, Tsiounis, and Yung [23] . They also provide a modular design to build such schemes along with a concrete instantiation. Their realization achieves a ciphertext size of 2.4 kB and a well-formedness proof of approximately 70 kB for an 80-bit security level and a 2 −50 soundness error. The main criticism to the proposal lies in entailing interaction with the verifier in order to prove the validity of the ciphertext. In fact, interaction can be cumbersome in situations where the encryptor needs to run the proof several times with different verifiers, as this would require remembering all the random coins used to form the ciphertext.
This shortcoming was addressed in subsequent works. First, Qin et al. [27] suggested a closely related primitive with non-interactive proofs of well-formedness of the ciphertext using the random oracle idealization. Then, Cathalo, Libert, and Yung [12] provided the first non-interactive realization of group encryption in the standard model. Their ciphertext and proof are also significantly shorter than those of [23] (the ciphertext size is 1.25 kB and the proof size is 16 .125 kB for a 128-bit security level). However, the dark side of this non-interactive proposal resides in the expensive cost of the proof verification (several thousands of pairing evaluations) due to the recourse to the Groth-Sahai [21] proof system.
To summarize the state of the art in group encryption, there is on the one hand an interactive proposal with a rather consequent size of the ciphertext and its proof of well-formedness, but which has the merit of having an efficient verification of this proof, and on the other hand, there is a non-interactive realization which significantly reduces the size of the ciphertext and its validity proof, but which is characterized by its computationally demanding proof verification that renders it fairly impractical.
It is would be nice to combine the best of the two works and come up with a scheme with short ciphertexts and proofs, and where both the interactive and non-interactive setting are efficiently supported. This is the main contribution of this paper.
Contributions and underlying ideas
We propose a new design strategy for group encryption which significantly improves the performance. Two main ideas underlay our conception.
First, instead of assembling highly secure components, we start with weaker -and so more efficientprimitives to get a group encryption scheme secure in a weak sense. The so-obtained scheme is next converted with a generic transform into a fully-secure group encryption scheme. In addition to efficiency, starting with weaker components also brings diversity and permits to develop further schemes, under various security assumptions. As a by-product, we show that the transform used to upgrade the security in group encryption applies to tag-based encryption and allows also to uplift the security in this primitive while preserving the verifiability properties.
Second, we encrypt only an alias of the receiver's public key in order to realize the opening functionality, leading consequently to important extra savings in both size and computation. In fact, the prior works [23, 12] include in the ciphertext an encryption (using the opening authority's public key) of the receiver's public key in order to implement the opening function. Since a public key often consists of a vector of group elements, [23, 12] use a CCA secure encryption to encrypt each component of the key. We remark that such an operation is unnecessary as the public keys are all maintained in a public database. Therefore, encrypting only an alias of the key (which will be recorded along with the key in the database) is enough for this functionality. The opening authority needs then to execute the extra step of looking up the database for the key corresponding to the alias, however we note that the recourse to the opening function is done only in case of disputes and occurs thus very rarely.
Our new generic construction accepts many practical instantiations which support both interactive and non-interactive validity proofs. For instance, we get for a 128-bit security level, a concrete realization in the standard model with a ciphertext size of 0.4 kB, an interactive proof of 1 kB, a non-interactive proof of 2 kB which requires 325 pairing evaluations (vs 3895 in [12] ) for the verification.
Outline of the paper The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section formally defines the syntax and the model of a secure group encryption scheme. Section 3 presents a generic construction to build group encryption schemes. It also provides a transform to turn a weakly-secure group encryption scheme into a fully-secure one. Subsequently, sufficient conditions for practical realizations and a detailed instantiation are described in Section 4. Finally, the paper concludes in Section 5.
Group Encryption: Syntax and Security Model
In this section, we review the formal definition of group encryption, as introduced in [23] . We also present the corresponding security notions.
It is useful to introduce some notation. For a two-party protocol between A and B, we represent its execution as output A | output B ← A(input A ), B(input B ) (common-input). The security properties are described through experiments where the adversary is given access to oracles. We write A oracle(·) to denote that adversary A has access to oracle oracle(·). When a query is not allowed, we use the symbol ¬: A oracle ¬(some query) (·) .
Syntax
A group encryption scheme consists of the following algorithms/protocols: setup(1 κ ) On input a security parameter κ, this probabilistic algorithm generates the public parameters param of the scheme. Although not always explicitly mentioned, param will serve as an input to all the algorithms/protocols that follow. (G r , R, sample R ) This tuple of algorithms is part of the setup procedure and is needed for verifiability; i.e.,
proving that the decryption of a certain ciphertext satisfies a given relation. In this sense, G r generates the key pair (pk R , sk R ) of the relation R from a security parameter. Similarly to [23, 12] , sk R can be empty if the relation R is publicly sampleable (e.g., the Diffie-Hellman relation in bilinear groups). On input the key pair of the relation R, algorithm sample R produces a pair (x, w) consisting of an instance x and a witness w for the relation R. The polynomial-time testing procedure R(x, w) returns 1 iff (x, w) belongs to the relation based on the public parameter pk R . keygen E (param) This probabilistic algorithm outputs the key pair (pk E , sk E ) of the entity E in the system; E can either be the group manager GM who manages the set of receivers (group members), or the opening authority OA that recovers the receiver's identity from a given ciphertext, or a group member User who receives ciphertexts. join = J User (param), GM(sk GM ) (pk GM ) This is an interactive protocol between GM and the potential joining group member J User . The latter sends her public key pk to GM and prospectively proves the correctness of her key, whereas GM issues (at the end of the protocol) a certificate cert pk that marks the effectiveness of the user's membership. GM stores additionally the pair (pk, cert pk ) in a public directory database. encrypt(pk GM , pk OA , pk, w, L) On input the respective public keys pk GM and pk OA of GM and OA, the (certified) public key pk of the receiver, this algorithm encrypts the witness w to produce a ciphertext ψ for a certain label L (which specifies the "context" of the encryption). prove = P(w, coins ψ ), V(param) (pk GM , pk OA , pk R , x, ψ, L) This is an interactive protocol between a sender P (acting as the prover) who has generated the ciphertext ψ and any verifier V; in this protocol, the sender uses the random coins used to produce ψ in order to prove that there is a group member whose key is registered in database and who is capable of decrypting ψ, under label L, and recovering a witness w such that (x, w) ∈ R. At the end of the protocol, the verifier outputs 1 if the proof is accepted, and 0 otherwise. decrypt(sk, ψ, L) On input the private key sk of the group user, this algorithm decrypts the ciphertext ψ, under label L, and outputs the witness w (or a rejection symbol ⊥). open(sk OA , ψ, L) On input the private key sk OA of OA and a ciphertext ψ with corresponding label L, this algorithm outputs the public key pk under which ψ was created.
Remark 1.
As aforementioned, the verifiability of encryption is optional. If verifiability is not desired, the relation R can be set to the trivial relation that includes any string of fixed size as a witness.
We require the scheme to be correct, that is, to properly offer the desired features for group encryption. More formally, we require for a group encryption scheme that the following "correctness game" returns 1 with overwhelming probability.
Experiment Exp correctness (κ)
If (out 1 = out 2 = out 3 = 1) return 1 else return 0.
Security model
Message security The message security captures the property that an adversary cannot learn any information whatsoever on a message from an encryption of it. Strong security guarantees require that this holds true even when the adversary has adaptive access to a decryption oracle. For group encryption, it is also assumed that the adversary may control the group manager and the opening authority, and that he has access to the prove oracle in the challenge phase. We let IND-CCA denote the corresponding security notion. There is a weaker notion, denoted IND-sl-wCCA, where the adversary commits to the target label beforehand (selective-label attacks) and is not allowed to issue decryption queries involving the target label (weak chosen-ciphertext attacks). Formally, a group encryption scheme meets the IND-sl-wCCA notion if the success probability of any polynomial-time adversary A to distinguish among encryptions of a chosen message and of a random message is at most negligibly better (in security parameter κ) than 1/2 in the experiment that follows. In this experiment we use the following notation (similar to that in [23, 12] .
: is a stateless decryption oracle which is restricted not to decrypt ciphertexts w.r.t. the label L.
: is a real-or random challenge oracle that is only queried once. It returns ψ, coins ψ such that ψ ← encrypt(pk GM , pk OA , pk, cert pk , w, L) if b = 1, and ψ ← encrypt(pk GM , pk OA , pk, cert pk , w ′ , L) otherwise, where w ′ is a random plaintext chosen uniformy in the space of messages of length 1 κ . In both cases coins ψ denote the random coins used to produce ψ. -prove b P,P ′ (pk GM , pk OA , pk R , x, L, ψ): this a stateful oracle that the adversary can query on multiple occasions. If b = 1, it runs the real prover P (of the proveprocedure) using the private inputs w, coins ψ , pk, cert pk to produce a real proof (the common input being pk GM , pk OA , pk R , x, L, ψ). If b = 0, the oracle runs a simulator P ′ on the same common input pk GM , pk OA , pk R , x, L, ψ, but which is deprived from the private input w, coins ψ (P ′ may have access to pk, cert pk ), to generate a simulated proof. As pointed in [23, 12] , designing an efficient simulator P ′ is part of proving the security property.
Experiment Exp
Anonymity The notion of anonymity is described in an analogous way and comes with similar variations. The goal of the adversary is now to distinguish among two possible receivers given the encryption of a same witness under two different public keys. Of course, the adversary does not control the opening authority (and so is given the public opening key pk OA ).
The formal definition of selective-label anonymity against weak chosen-ciphertext attacks (in short, ANO-sl-wCCA) follows. The notion of ANO-sl-wCCA is met if the success probability of any polynomialtime adversary A is at most negligibly better than 1/2. The formal definition of ANO-CCA (anonymity against chosen-ciphertext attacks) is obtained by modifying the experiment as for the IND-CCA notion (see above). Similarly to [23, 12] , we introduce the following notations:
: is a stateless opening oracle, for the key pk OA , which is restricted not to open ciphertexts w.r.t. the label L.
: is a challenge oracle that is only queried once. It returns ψ, coins ψ such that ψ ← encrypt(pk GM , pk OA , pk b , cert b , w, L) and coins ψ denote the random coins used to produce ψ. -User(pk GM ): is a stateful oracle that simulates two executions of J User to introduce two honest users in the group. It uses a string keys where the outputs of the two executions are written.
Soundness In a soundness attack, the adversary creates adaptively the intended group of receivers communicating with the genuine group manager. The adversary is successful if it can produce a ciphertext ψ and a corresponding proof of validity w.r.t. a relation R with a chosen pk R such that (1) ψ is invalid, or (2) opening ψ results in an invalid public key or a value which is not equal to the public key of any group member. We adhere to the same formal definition of [23, 12] which we recall in Appendix B.
Building Group Encryption Schemes
In this section we present our new strategy to build efficient group encryption schemes. We start by providing a construction which achieves "weak" security properties from "weakly secure" components. Next, we use a technique evocative of the Canetti-Halevi-Katz transformation to upgrade the security of the resulting construction into full-fledged CCA security. In the rest of this document, and in order to avoid confusion, we use of a dot notation to refer the different components; for instance, Γ.encrypt() refers to the encryption algorithm of public-key scheme Γ, Σ.pk to the public key of signature scheme Σ, etc.
A generic construction
Our construction for group encryption departs from the specific constructions in [23, 12] in encrypting only an alias to the public key (computed using a function H) instead of encrypting the entire public key. As will become apparent, such a change drastically reduces the cost and size of the resulting encryption. Moreover, and similarly to [12] , it does not include the commitment on the public key (and potentially on its certificate) in the ciphertext.
Let Γ User = (keygen, encrypt, decrypt) and Γ OA = (keygen, encrypt, decrypt) be two public-key encryption schemes with labels. Let further Σ = (keygen, sign, verify) be a signature scheme. We assume that the message space of Σ includes the public-key space of Γ User . Finally, let H denote a collision-resistant function from the public key space of Γ User to the message space of Γ OA . The properties required for H to guarantee an efficient prove algorithm/protocol are described in the next section. The definitions of the different building blocks involved are summarized in Appendix A.
setup(1 κ ) This algorithm invokes the setup algorithms for the building blocks (namely, Γ User , Γ OA , and Σ), and outputs param. The public parameters param are input to all the subsequent algorithms/protocols and further include the description of a relation R along with a key pair (pk R , sk R ) necessary for sampling pairs (x, w) where (x, w) ∈ R and w belongs to the message space of Γ User . Finally, setup outputs also a description of a collision-resistant function H which maps elements from the public key space of Γ User into elements in the message space of Γ OA .
keygen GM (1 κ ) This algorithm invokes Σ.keygen(1 κ ) and outputs (pk GM , sk GM ) = (Σ.pk, Σ.sk). OA under label L with public key pk OA . The ciphertext consists of the pair (ψ 1 , ψ 2 ). prove = P(w, coins Ψ ), V(param) (pk GM , pk OA , pk R , x, ψ, L) P who created the ciphertext ψ = (ψ 1 , ψ 2 ) uses the coins used to produce ψ in order to prove to V:
-knowledge of the message underlying ψ 1 and that it forms a witness for the instance x w.r.t. the relation R; -knowledge of the decryption of ψ 2 and that it corresponds to the value of the function H on the public key under which ψ 1 is created; -knowledge of a certificate on the public key used to create ψ 1 .
These proofs are detailed in Section 4. A formal proof is provided in Appendix C.
A Canetti-Halevi-Katz like paradigm for group encryption
Canetti, Halevi, and Katz [10] provide a method that transforms any selective-identity chosen-plaintext secure identity-based scheme into one with full-fledged chosen-ciphertext security. The transformation, referred to as the CHK transform, consists in signing the ciphertext, result of encryption with the weakly secure identity-based encryption scheme, using a one-time signature scheme, wherein the "identity" is given by the verification key. Later in [7] , Boneh and Katz improve the CHK transform using a MAC instead of a one-time signature; see also [6] . Concurrently, MacKenzie, Reiter, and Yang [26] present a method for converting a weakly chosen-ciphertext secure tag-based encryption scheme to a fully secure public-key encryption scheme. Finally, Kiltz [24] combines the ideas of [10, 26, 7] in order to derive chosenciphertext secure public-key encryption schemes from selective-tag weakly chosen-ciphertext secure tagbased encryption schemes using one-time signatures. Remark 2. This transformation can be also used to upgrade the security in TBE (from st-wCCA to full CCA indistinguishability and anonymity). In [24] , Kiltz suggests to achieve this task via a CCA secure public key encryption (PKE): first derive a CCA secure PKE from a st-wCCA secure TBE, then identify the pair "(message,tag)" in the TBE by the message "message tag" in the PKE.
Our transform has the merit of preserving the algebraic structure of the message to be encrypted. This impacts positively the verifiability of the encryption, i.e. proving knowledge of the message underlying the resulting CCA encryption is as efficient as proving knowledge of the message underlying its st-wCCA encryption.
Efficient Instantiations
The sender of the message, in the construction provided in the previous section, is compelled to provide the following proof in the prove procedure: PoK = {(pk, cert pk , w) : cert pk = Σ.sign Σ.sk (pk)
where the private input of the prover are the coins used to form ψ 1 , ψ 2 in addition to pk, cert pk , and m.
According to whether we want to provide an interactive or a non-interactive prove procedure, the components underlying the construction have to satisfy different conditions:
Non-interactive setting We can provide a non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) prove if the language defined by this procedure is compatible with the Groth-Sahai proof system [21] (Appendix A.5). In fact, [21] provides efficient NIZK or NIWI proofs for a number of languages that cover pairing-product equations, multi-scalar multiplication, and quadratic equations. In this case, the common reference string (CRS) needs to be part of the setup algorithm. Besides, the private input of the prover has to consist of only group elements. Moreover, the building blocks, namely Σ, Γ User , Γ OA , H, and R need to perform only group or pairing (if bilinear groups are involved) operations on this private input. For example, we can consider structure-preserving signatures [19, 17, 1] for the certification scheme Σ, Kiltz' [24] or Cash et al.'s [11] (described in Figure 8 ) encryption schemes for both Γ User or Γ OA , the discrete logarithm or the Diffie-Hellman relation for R, and any function H performing group or pairing operations on the input. Note however that the statments underlying prove that consist of pairing-product equations need to be of special form (see Appendix A.5) in order to accept zero knowledge proofs (otherwise prove will be only witness-indistinguishable).
Interactive setting While having a number of useful properties, non-interactive proofs built from GrothSahai's proof system suffer the high verification cost due to the pairing evaluations in the verification. Therefore, it would judicious to support the construction in the previous section with an interactive variant of prove. This will decree different conditions on the building blocks. The essence of these conditions consists in manipulating the private input, which has to comprise only group elements, through homomorphic maps.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. Subsection 1 will introduce formally the classes of the different components Σ, Γ User , Γ OA , H, and R that will lead to an efficient interactive prove. Subsection 2 describes explicitly the interactive prove protocol in case the building blocks are instantiated from the previously presented classes. Finally, we provide a concrete realization of group encryption in Subsection 3 and compare the resulting performances with the those of the prior proposals [23, 12] .
Building blocks
Definition 1 (The class S of certification/signature schemes). S is the set of all digital signatures Σ for which there exists a pair of efficient algorithms, convert and retrieve, where convert inputs a verification key vk, a key pk (to be certified), and a valid signature cert pk (w.r.t. vk) on pk, and outputs a tuple (S, R) such that:
R is information theoretically independent from cert pk and pk. I.e. There exists an algorithm simulate that inputs a verification key vk from the verification key space and outputs a string statistically indistinguishable from R. 2. There exists an algorithm compute that on the input vk and R, computes a description of a map F : (G
-where (G S , * S ) and (G pk , * pk ) are groups and G F is a set equipped with the binary operation
and an I such that F(S, pk) = I.
The retrieve algorithm inputs a candidate tuple (S, R, pk) (satisfying the above conditions) and vk, and outputs a key pk and a valid certificate cert pk on it w.r.t. vk.
Informally, this class includes signature schemes where the signature on a given message can be converted into a "simulatable" part (denoted by R in the definition) that does not reveal any information about the signature or the message to be signed (denoted by pk), and a "vital" part (denoted by S) such that S and pk form a preimage, by a homomorphic map F, of some quantity I computed only from R and the public parameters. The last condition dictated by the retrieve algorithm guarantees the non-triviality of the map F; given (S, R, pk) satisfying F(S, pk) = I (I computed as prescribed by the definition), one can come up with a pair of a message and a valid signature on it w.r.t. the same verification key.
Signatures from this class accept efficient proofs of knowledge of a signature/certificate cert pk on a hidden message (pk). In fact, the prover will first convert cert pk into (S, R), then reveal R to the verifier, and finally prove knowledge of the preimage of I (computed as in the definition) via the map F. The last proof can be efficiently carried out thanks to the homomorphic property of F. Moreover, existence of the retrieve algorithm guarantees the special soundness (SpS) property of the protocol. Finally, this class accepts many instantiations for instance the signature in [1] . See Appendix E.1 for the details.
Definition 2 (The class R of relations). R is the set of relations R such that there exists an algorithm which inputs an instance x from the set of instances G x (in addition to the public parameters) and outputs a description of a map
-where G w is the set of witnesses which is a group for * w , and G R is a set equipped with the binary operation
.
Examples of such functions include the discrete logarithm or the Diffie-Hellman function. Likewise, one can prove knowledge of a witness corresponding to a given instance thanks to the homomorphic property of F R .
Definition 3 (The class E 1 of encryption schemes). E 1 is the set of tag-based encryption (TBE) schemes Γ that have the following properties:
1. The message space G w and the public key space G pk are groups with respect to * w and * pk respectively.
Let w ∈ G w be a message and e its encryption with respect to a tag t under a public key pk. On the common input pk, w, e, and t, there exists an efficient zero knowledge proof of w being the decryption of e with respect to the key pk and the tag t. The private input of the prover is the randomness used to produce the encryption e. 3. Given an encryption e of some message under some public key w.r.t. a given tag t, there exists an efficient
algorithm compute which inputs e and outputs a public key pk ′ ∈ G pk , a message w ′ , and its encryption
t. the same tag t, such that:
-The probability distributions of the random variables pk ′ ∈ G pk and w ′ ∈ G w are indistinguishable from uniform, where the probability is taken over the ciphertext e, the tag t, and the random coins of compute.
-One can define a group operation • e on the set
• e e, where w and pk are the message and public key underlying the encryption e respectively. Moreover, given the randomnesses used to produce e and e ′ , one can deduce (using only the public parameters) the randomness used to produce e ′ • e e on w ′ * w w under the key pk ′ * pk pk.
The class E 1 informally comprises encryption schemes that possess efficient proofs of correctness of decryption (i.e. proofs that a given ciphertext correctly decrypts to a given message) in addition to being homomorphic w.r.t. both the message and the public key. This might seem restrictive at a first glance, however, it turns out that the ElGamal-based family of encryption schemes satisfy nicely the properties required in the above definition. We note as an illustration the tag-based variant of the modified CramerShoup scheme [11] described in Figure 3 (we provide the analysis of this class in Appendix E.2).
Definition 4 (The class H of functions). H is the set of functions H
-G pk is a group w.r.t. some binary operation * pk , and G H is a set equipped with a binary operation * H .
It is natural to require that H(pk) for some public key pk in database identifies pk uniquely; i.e. there are no different pk and pk ′ in database that are mapped to the same value by the function H. In this sense, requiring H to be collision-resistant seems natural, however we remark that in our application of group encryption, GM has some control over the public keys she certifies, and therefore may proceed to simple measures (see the instantiation in Appendix E.3) in case a collision occurs.
Definition 5 (The class E 2 of encryption schemes). E 2 is the set of tag-based encryption schemes Γ that have the following properties:
1. The message space is a group G H w.r.t. some binary operation * H and the ciphertext space C is a set equipped with some binary operation • c .
Let h ∈ G H be a message and e its encryption with respect to a given key pk and a given tag t. On the common input pk, t, h, and e, there exists an efficient zero knowledge proof of h being the decryption of e with respect to t under the key pk. The private input of the prover is the randomness used to produce the encryption e. 3. ∀ h, h
′ ∈ G H , ∀ pk, ∀t : Γ.encrypt pk (h * H h ′ , t) = Γ.encrypt pk (h, t) • c Γ.encrypt pk (h ′ ,
t). Moreover, given the randomness used to encrypt h in Γ.encrypt pk (h, t) and h
′ in Γ.encrypt pk (h ′ , t
), one can deduce (using only the public parameters) the randomness used to produce
Examples of encryption schemes in the above class include Kiltz' [24] and Cash et al.'s [11] (described in Figure 8 ) tag-based encryption schemes. In fact, the encryption algorithm in both schemes is homomorphic w.r.t. the message, and both schemes accept efficient proofs of the correctness of a decryption, namely the proof of knowledge of discrete logarithms which satisfy known predicates (linear relations). The analysis of this class is provided in Appendix E.4.
The prove protocol
In this paragraph, we instantiate the construction in Section 3 with the following constituents:
1. A signature scheme Σ from Class S with key pair (sk GM , pk GM ), and corresponding function
2. An encryption scheme Γ 1 from Class E 1 with public key space (G pk , * pk ), message space (G w , * w ), and with ciphertext subset (E, • e ) (as defined in Definition 3). 3. A relation R from Class R with instance space G x and witness space (G w , * w ). 4. A function H from Class H with domain (G pk , * pk ) and codomain (G H , * H ).
5. An encryption scheme Γ 2 from Class E 2 with key pair (sk OA , pk OA ), message space (G H , * H ), and ciphertext space (C, • c ). Figure 2 is an efficient zero knowledge proof of knowledge with the SpS property.
Theorem 3. The prove protocol depicted in

Theorem 4 (Soundness of the construction in Section 3). The construction in Section 3 is sound if the prove protocol satisfies the SpS property, and the used certification scheme is EUF-CMA secure.
The proofs are provided in Appendix E.5 and Appendix E.6 respectively. 
and PoK 2 are valid.
Fig. 2.
Proof system for membership to the language {(w, pk, cert pk ) : 2 , t, x, pk OA , pk GM ) and Private input: (w, pk, cert pk ) and randomness used to produce e 1 and e 2 .
A concrete realization
In this subsection, we consider bilinear groups with e : G 1 × G 2 −→ G T . Moreover, we instantiate this system with the Λ sxdh setting which refers to the case of asymmetric pairings for which the DDH assumption holds in both G 1 and G 2 .
assume that the DDH assumption holds in both G 1 and G 2 .
We instantiate the construction in Section 3 with the following bricks:
1. The signature scheme from [1] . The scheme signs in particular messages in G 4 2 . 2. The encryption scheme described in Figure 3 to instantiate both Γ User and Γ OA . The message space of both Γ User and Γ OA is the group G 2 (we provide in Appendix F the security analysis of this scheme).
, where a 1 , . . . , a 4 are public elements in Z d (d is order of G 2 ). We provide in Appendix E.3 the analysis of the collision-resistance of H. 5. The one-time signature from [20] .
The ciphertext will then comprise 13 group elements, which amounts to 0.4 kB if we consider an implementation using a 256-bit group size. This is definitely more compact than the realization in [12] (1.25 kB using a 256-bit group order ) or [23] (2.5 kB using 1024-bit moduli).
Moreover, the prove procedure can be carried out interactively or non-interactively. We summarize in this chart the performances of our realization compared to those of [23] and [12] (see Appendix G and Appendix H for the details).
[Setup]
Choose a group (G, ·) generated by g with prime order d.
For a message m ∈ G and a tag t ∈ Z d : [2] , which reduces the cost of verification of GS proofs at the expense of soundness. Applying this technique to our non-interactive proof reduces the required number of pairings to approximately 81 (vs 974 pairings for the proof in [12] ). It is also worthnoting that the group encryption scheme in [12] would only need 1182 (295 using the batch technique) pairings if instantiated with the certification scheme in [1] , which remains still higher than the 325 (81) pairings required in our proof. Besides, the realization in [23] which has the merit of not requiring any pairings in its (interactive) proof does comprise however an expensive computation which consists in repeating 50 times a sub-protocol in order to reduce the knowledge error.
Summary and Perspectives
We presented a new security model for group encryption which captures all the required security features (anonymity, message security and soundness) in a weaker attack model, namely selective-label weak chosen ciphertext attacks (sl-wCCA). We also proposed a construction for sl-wCCA secure group encryption from weakly secure components (st-wCCA secure encryption). Our construction departs from the previous constructions in encrypting only an alias or hash of the recipient's public key instead of the entire key, and thus has the merit of avoiding the linear dependency between the key and its encryption. We then applied a method reminiscent of the Canetti-Halevi-Katz paradigm in order to upgrade the security of the resulting construction to full adaptive CCA security. This detour made to get fully secure group encryption allows to use homomorphic (tag-based) encryption as building blocks which impacts positively the prove procedure. In fact, we define classes of building blocks that lead to group encryption schemes where prove is an efficient Σ protocol. The advantages of our technique are manifest in the realization we provide as we achieve efficient and shorter ciphertexts. Moreover, our proofs are also shorter and can be carried out with or without interaction with the verifier.
A future direction of research consists in developing more efficient proofs (interactive or non-interactive) of knowledge of a certified public key, since this is the main bottleneck in group encryption design. So far, we resorted to structure-preserving signatures to achieve this goal. One could also envisage further solutions.
Proofs of set membership
The public keys along with their certificates are published in a public database. Therefore, one could simply prove the membership of the public key in question (committed to in a public value) to this database. Camenisch et al. [8] presented an efficient solution using as sub-protocol the proof of knowledge of a signature on a hidden message; the instantiation they provide uses Boneh-Boyen [4] 's signature as the considered messages are 160-bit exponents (further instantiations using [9, 14] signatures or cryptographic accumulators [9] are also possible). Obviously, if we use this technique in our case, then we will have again recourse to structure-preserving signatures as the considered messages lie in a group. Therefore, finding new efficient techniques for set membership proofs, where the set elements lie in a group, would have a direct impact on group encryption.
Signatures on randomized ciphertexts Blazy et al. [3] introduced a new primitive which allows to, given a signature on a ciphertext, produce a new ciphertext on the same message along with a fresh signature on it (the new ciphertext). They give a concrete realization of this primitive using Waters' [30] signature and ElGamal's [16] or the linear encryption [5] . The scheme satisfies a reasonable security notion (difficulty to come up with a valid signature on an encryption of a new message) under standard assumptions (CDH or slightly stronger variants), however it suffers the high verification cost (due to the recourse to Groth-Sahai's proof system) in addition to the consequent size of the ciphertexts and corresponding signatures.
We could use this primitive in our application of group encryption; GM will publish the public keys together with their encryptions and signatures on these encryptions using this mechanism. GM will further publish the coins used to encrypt the public key in order to convince of the well-formedness of the ciphertext. In this case, the sub-protocol of prove which proves knowledge of the certified public key will consist of a randomization of the pair (ciphertext,signature). This solution presents the advantage of having a security under standard assumptions (compared to the assumptions underlying the proposed structure-preserving signatures), however, it is afflicted with the expensive aforementioned cost and bandwidth. Therefore, any significant improvement in this primitive will translate immediately in an improvement in group encryption design.
A Building Blocks
A.1 Signature schemes
A signature scheme Σ comprises three algorithms, namely the key generation algorithm keygen, the signing algorithm sign, and the verification algorithm verify. The standard security notion for a signature scheme is existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA), which was introduced in [18] . Informally, this notion refers to the hardness of, given a signing oracle, producing a valid pair of message and corresponding signature such that message has not been queried to the signing oracle. There exists also the stronger notion, SEUF-CMA (strong existential unforgeability under chosen message attack), which allows the adversary to produce a forgery on a previously queried message, however the corresponding signature must not be obtained from the signing oracle.
A.2 Tag-based encryption (TBE)
Tag-based encryption, also referred to as encryption with labels, was first introduced in [29] . In these schemes, the encryption algorithm takes as input, in addition to the public key pk and the message m intended to be encrypted, a tag t which specifies information related to the message m and its encryption context. Similarly, the decryption algorithm takes additionally to the ciphertext and the private key the tag under which the ciphertext was created. Security notions are then defined as usual except that the adversary specifies to his challenger the tag to be used in the challenge ciphertext, and in case he (the adversary) is allowed to query oracles, then he cannot query them on the pair formed by the challenge ciphertext and the tag used to form it. There are also weakened security models for this type of encryption where the adversary specifies the challenge tag before getting the parameters of the scheme, and during the game, he (the adversary) is not allowed to query the allowed oracles w.r.t. the challenge tag; we talk in this case about selective tag security. We specify in the following the formal definitions of IND-st-wCCA and ANO-st-wCCA security for tag-based encryption:
Definition 6 (IND-st-wCCA indistinguishability). Let Γ be a tag-based encryption scheme scheme. Let further A denote a PPTM. We consider the following random experiment:
We define the advantage of A via:
running in time t and issuing q d decryption queries, A has Adv
Definition 7 (ANO-st-wCCA anonymity). Let Γ be a tag-based encryption scheme scheme. Let further A denote a PPTM. We consider the following random experiment:
¬(−,t) (sk 1 ,.) (pk 0 , pk 1 );
We define the advantage of A via: 
A.3 One-time signatures
One-time digital signature schemes can be used to sign, at most, one message; otherwise, signatures can be forged. A new public key is required for each message that is signed. One-time signature schemes have the advantage that signature generation and verification are very efficient. This is due to the fact that they rely on one-way functions without trapdoors. They are, similarly to normal digital signatures, defined by the key generation algorithm keygen, the signing algorithm sign, and the verification algorithm verify. The strong security for one-time signatures is defined as follows.
Definition 8.
Let Σ = (keygen, sign, verify) be a one-time signature scheme, and let A be a PPTM. We consider the following random experiment, where κ is a security parameter: 
A.4 Proofs of Knowledge (PoK)
A proof of knowledge is modeled by an interactive proof system, first introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff GoldwasserMicaliRackoff1989. Such a system informally consists of a prover P trying to convince a verifier V that an instance x belongs to a language L. x refers to the common input whereas (P, V)(x) denotes the proof instance carried between P and V at the end of which V is (not) convinced with the membership of the alleged instance x to L: (P, V)(x) ∈ {Accept, Reject} P is modeled by a probabilistic Turing machine whereas V is modeled by a polynomial probabilistic Turing machine. During (P, V)(x), the parties exchange a sequence of messages called the proof transcript. A proof of knowledge should satisfy completeness which denotes the property of successfully running the protocol is both parties are honest. A further property required in proofs of knowledge is soundness notion which captures the inability of a cheating prover P to convince the verifier V with an invalid statement.
ZK proofs of knowledge. Let (P, V) be an interactive proof system for some language L. We say that (P, V) is zero knowledge if for every x ∈ L, the proof transcript (P, V)(x) can be produced by a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm (in the size of the input) S with indistinguishable probability distributions.
Σ protocols. A public-coin protocol is a protocol in which the verifier chooses all its messages randomly from publicly known sets. A three-move protocol can be written in a canonical form in which the messages sent in the three moves are often called commitment, challenge, and response. The protocol is said to have the honest-verifier zero-knowledge property (HVZK) if there exists an algorithm that is able, provided the verifier behaves as prescribed by the protocol, to produce, without the knowledge of the secret, transcripts that are indistinguishable from those of the real protocol. The protocol is said to have the special soundness property (SpS) property if there exists an algorithm that is able to extract the secret from two accepting transcripts of the protocol with the same commitment and different challenges. Finally, a three-move public-coin protocol with both the HVZK and SpS properties is called a Σ protocol.
A.5 Groth-Sahai's proof system
The Groth-Sahai (GS) proof system gives efficient non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) and non-interactive witness-indistinguishable (NIWI) proofs for algebraic statements involving elements in groups equipped with a bilinear map e : G 1 × G 2 ← G T (we assume that ), e.g.
A pairing-product equation over variables
, and t T ∈ G T .
A multi-scalar multiplication over variables y 1 , . . . , y m ∈ Z d and X 1 , . . . ,
, and T ∈ G 1 . A multi-scalar multiplication equation over variables in G 2 is defined analogously. A quadratic equation over variables x 1 , . . . , x m and y 1 , . . . ,
For constants a 1 , . . . , a n and
The principle of the GS proof system consists in using the setup parameters and the common reference string (CRS) to commit to the witness components, then generate proof elements that these values committed to satisfy the equations underlying the statement to be proved. Note that proofs for pairing-product equations are only (WI) when t T ∈ G T has no particular structure. They can be however transformed into ZK proofs (at the expense of an additional cost) if t T is equal to 1 G T or its representation as a pairing product equation is known.
The GS proof system could be instantiated under different (mild) assumptions, in particular the Λ sxdh setting which refers to the case of asymmetric pairings for which the DDH assumptions holds in both G 1 and G 2 . 
B Soundness of Group Encryption Schemes
The formal definition of soundness involves an oracle reg(sk GM , ·) that simulates the group manager GM and maintains a repository database that maintains the registered public keys along with their certificates. The space of valid ciphertexts is denoted by L x,L,pk R ,pk GM ,pk OA ,pk ciphertext and is given by L x,L,pk R ,pk GM ,pk OA ,pk ciphertext = encrypt(pk GM , pk OA , pk, w, L) : (x, w) ∈ R and pk ∈ database
The space of valid public keys is denoted by L
param PK
. A group encryption scheme satisfies soundness if for any polynomial-time adversary A, the experiment below returns 1 with negligible probability.
Experiment Exp
x,L,pk R ,pk GM ,pk OA ,pk ciphertext ) return 1 else return 0.
C Proof of Theorem 1 C.1 Message security
Proof. Let A be a (t, ǫ, q d )-IND-sl-wCCA against the above construction. We will build a (t, ǫ, q d )-IND-st-wCCA adversary B against Γ User by using a sequence of games Game i where the first one corresponds to the standard security game for the IND-sl-wCCA property for group encryption, and the last one corresponds to the standard game for the IND-st-wCCA security notion for TBE. In the rest of the proof, S i denotes the event that the experiment in Game i returns 1.
Game 0 . B plays the real IND-sl-wCCA security game with A.
In this game, we use the zero knowledge (ZK) simulator S (of prove since it is ZK by assumption) as the prover P ′ . In fact, S is more powerful than P ′ as it (S) can simulate the prover in the standard prove procedure without knowledge of pk, cert pk . By definition, Pr[S 0 ] = ǫ + (pk GM , pk OA , pk R , x, L, ψ). Clearly, this modification does not impact the probability space of S 4 due to the zero-knowledge property of prove (the execution of prove using the real prover is indistinguishable from that using the simulator). 
C.2 Anonymity
Proof. Let A be a (t, ǫ, q d )-ANO-sl-wCCA attacker against the construction which is assumed to use a (t, ǫ sec , q d )-IND-st-wCCA secure tag-based encryption Γ OA . We will build a (t, ǫ 2 − ǫ sec , q d )-ANO-st-wCCA adversary against the underlying encryption Γ User as follows. Likewise, we will proceed using a sequence of games Game i and will denote by S i the event that the experiment in Game i returns 1.
Game 0 . B plays the real ANO-sl-wCCA security game of with A. . We claim that any significant distance between Game 3 and Game 2 conditioned on the event ¬Z will give rise to a (t, ǫ sec , q d ) IND-st-wCCA adversary B ′ against Γ OA . In fact, B ′ will execute the standard ANO-sl-wCCA game with A with the exception of substituting the opening oracle in lines 3, 6 by her own decryption oracle for pk OA (the decryption oracles for pk 0 , pk 1 will be simulated internally as B ′ knows the corresponding privates keys). B ′ gives H(pk 0 ), H(pk 1 ) as challenge messages to her Γ OA challenger, and receives an encryption 
Experiment Exp
ANO-sl-wCCA A (κ) 1. param ← setup(1 κ ); (pk OA , sk OA ) ← keygen OA (1 κ , param); 2. (aux, pk GM , L) ← A(param); aux ← A User(pk GM ),open ¬(·,L) (sk OA ,·) (aux, pk OA ); If keys (pk 0 , sk 0 , cert pk 0 , pk 1 , sk 1 , cert pk 1 ) return 0; 3. (aux, x, w, pk R ) ← A open ¬(·,L) (sk OA ,·), decrypt ¬(·,L) (sk 0 ,·), decrypt ¬(·,L) (sk 1 ,·) (aux); 4. If (x, w) R return 0; 5. b R ← − {0, 1}; (ψ, coins ψ ) ← CH b anon (pk GM , pk OA , pk 0 , pk 1 , w, L); 6. b ⋆ ← A prove P(w,coins ψ ,pk b ,cert pk b ) (pk GM ,pk OA ,pk R ,x,L,ψ),open ¬(·,L) (sk OA ,·), decrypt ¬(·,L) (sk 0 ,·), decrypt ¬(·,L) (sk 1 ,·) (aux, ψ);adv IND−st−wCCA Γ OA (B ′ ) ≥ | Pr[b ′′ = b ′ ] − 1 2 | = | Pr[b ′′ = 0, b ′ = 0] + Pr[b ′′ = 1, b ′ = 1] − 1 2 | = 1 2 | Pr[b ′′ = 0|b ′ = 0] + Pr[b ′′ = 1|b ′ = 1] − 1| = 1 2 | Pr[b ′′ = 1|b ′ = 0] − Pr[b ′′ = 1|b ′ = 1]| = 1 2 | Pr[S 3 |¬Z] − Pr[S 2 |¬Z]|(B) ≥ Pr[b = 0]| Pr[S 3 ] − 1 2 | ≥ ǫ 2 − ǫ sec . ⊓ ⊔
C.3 Soundness
Similarly to the proofs in [23, 12] , the soundness of the construction follows as a direct consequence of the soundness of the prove procedure and the EUF-CMA security of the underlying signature/certification scheme. We provide further (in Appendix E.6) a simple soundness proof in case the construction is instantiated from the building blocks described in Section 4.
D A Canetti-Halevi-Katz like Paradigm for Group Encryption
D.1 Message security
Proof. Let A be an IND-CCA adversary against GE. We will build from A an IND-sl-wCCA adversary R against the underlying GE ⋆ . We proceed by using a sequence of games Game i where the first one mirrors the standard game for IND-CCA security for group encryption (GE) whereas the last one corresponds to that of IND-sl-wCCA security for GE. We will denote by S i the event that the experiment in Game i returns 1.
Game 0 . R plays the real IND-CCA security game of GE with A. , vk i ) from her challenger whose answer will be forwarded to A. In the second case R aborts the simulation. Let F 1 be the event corresponding to A submitting a valid ciphertext
Experiment Exp
In this game, R changes the construction of the challenge in line 6. A outputs (x, w, pk R ), such that (x, w) ∈ R, along with the challenge label L. At that point, R transfers the former items to C as a challenge, and receives ψ sl−wCCA as a challenge encryption: ψ sl−wCCA = GE ⋆ .encrypt(pk GM , pk OA , pk, w b , S.pk) for some b R ← − {0, 1} such that w 1 = w and w 0 is a random plaintext uniformly chosen from the plaintext space. Upon receipt of the challenge, R will produce a one-time signature σ on ψ sl−wCCA L using S.sk. Finally R will hand the triple ψ = (ψ sl−wCCA , S.pk, σ) as a challenge encryption. Note that ψ is a valid IND-CCA challenge for GE. Moreover, R can perfectly handle queries to prove b P,P ′ (pk GM , pk OA , pk R , x, L, ψ) using her own (external) oracle prove
Game 4 . In this game, R simulates the decryption oracle decrypt in line 7. Consider the decryption query
We distinguish two cases of queries. If vk i S.pk, then R proceeds as usual using her own decryption oracle. Otherwise, R responds with ⊥ if the output of S.verify vki (σ i , ψ sl−wCCA i L i ) is 0, and aborts otherwise. Let F 2 be the event corresponding to A submitting a valid ciphertext ψ i = (ψ sl−wCCA i , vk i , σ i ), w.r.t. label L i , where vk i = S.pk. We distinguish two cases: and thus ψ i ψ (since q i (ψ, L) ), then we have (ψ
. Finally, when A answers b ′ , R will return the same answer to her challenger. R will succeed in solving her challenge with advantage at least
D.2 Anonymity
Proof. Let A be an ANO-CCA adversary against GE. We will build from A an ANO-sl-wCCA adversary R against the underlying GE ⋆ . We proceed similarly to the previous proof by using a sequence of games Game i where the first one mirrors the standard game for ANO-CCA security for GE and the last one corresponds to that of ANO-sl-wCCA security for GE. We will denote likewise by S i the event that the experiment in Game i returns 1.
Game 0 . R plays the real ANO-CCA security game of GE with A.
By definition, Pr[S 0 ] = ǫ + 1 2 . Game 1 . R replaces param and (pk OA , sk OA ) (in lines 1) by those obtained from her own challenger C. She also forwards pk GM (obtained from A in line 2) to C. R further generates a key pair (S.pk, S.sk) for a suitable (t, ǫ ′ ) strongly secure one-time signature scheme S, then presents S.pk to C as a challenge tag. Finally R issues the certificates on the challenge keys pk 0 , pk 1 using A.
Game 2 . R simulates in this game the decryption and opening oracles in line 3. Decryption queries (ψ i , L i ) with respect to pk 0 or pk 1 are answered as in the message security proof. I.e., first parse ψ i as (ψ , vk i , σ i )). In case it is not consistent, then respond with ⊥, otherwise R will use her own opening oracle in the case where vk i S.pk and aborts the simulation in the opposite one. Similarly, a (decryption or opening) query causing R to abort will naturally lead to a forgery on S.
Game 3 . In this game, R changes the construction of the challenge in line 5 as follows. A will output (x, w, L, pk R ), such that (x, w) ∈ R, as a challenge to R. This latter will forward the same quantities except L to her challenger C. She receives as a challenge encryption ψ sl−wCCA = GE ⋆ .encrypt(pk GM , pk OA , pk b , w, S.pk) where b R ← − {0, 1}. Construction of A's challenge is done in a straightforward manner, namely produce a one-time signature σ on ψ sl−wCCA L using S.sk and set ψ = (ψ sl−wCCA , S.pk, σ) as a challenge encryption. It is easy to see that this challenge is a valid GE encryption of w under label L using either pk 0 or pk 1 . Moreover, R uses her external prove P(w,coins ψ sl−wCCA ,pk b ,cert pk b ) (pk GM , pk OA , pk R , x, L, ψ sl−wCCA ) oracle to handle queries to the prove P(w,coins ψ ,pk b ,cert pk b ) (pk GM , pk OA , pk R , x, L, ψ) oracle. Thus Pr[S 3 ] = Pr[S 2 ]. Game 4 . In this game, R simulates the decryption and opening oracles in line 6.
] be a decryption/opening query. Naturally q i (ψ, L). Likewise we distinguish two cases. Either vk i S.pk in which case R proceeds as usual using her own decryption/opening oracles. Or vk i = S.pk in which case A aborts (we assume that ψ is consistent since otherwise R can perfectly simulate the real decryption/opening algorithms by rejecting the ciphertext). Similarly, we have Pr [S 4 
. Finally, when A responds with b ′ , R will forward the same guess to her own challenger. R will succeed in solving her challenge with advantage at least
E Efficient Instantiations E.1 The class S of signatures
Fact 1
The signature [1] belongs to the class S.
Proof. Let cert pk = (z, r, s, t, u, v, w) be a signature produced on a message pk = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) w.r.t. a public
}. We apply the SigRand partial randomization algorithm of [1, Subsection 4.4, Partial randomizability] to get the new signature on pk, say cert
has the following properties:
is information-theoretically independent of cert pk and pk. See [1] for further details. Moreover, we define:
and
It is easy to check that:
, * S is the component-wise product in G 3 2 , and * pk is the component-wise product in G n 2 . We further define convert(cpk, pk, cert pk ) = SigRand(cpk, cert pk 
is itself a signature on pk, then the retrieve algorithm is nothing but the identity function.
⊓ ⊔ Figure 7 is a zero knowledge proof of knowledge with the SpS property, for proving knowledge of a signature, produced using a scheme from Class S on some message.
Theorem 5. The protocol depicted in
Prover P Verifier V Run convert(cpk, pk, cert pk ) to get (S, R) as in Definition 1 We first remark that the function F used in the definition of the class S induces a group law in F(G S × G pk ) for the operation • F (actually, the order of F(G S × G pk ) is the lcm of the orders of both G S and G pk ). Moreover, we have 1
Proof. For completeness, it is clear that if both parties follow the protocol, the prover will always be able to provide a proof that the verifier will accept. The protocol satisfies further the special soundness property. In fact, suppose we have for the same ( f ′ , R) two accepting answers (z S , z pk ) and (z S , z pk ) for two different challenges b and b respectively. Then 
Applying retrieve to ( S, R, pk) gives a valid certificate (signature) on the key pk. To prove that the protocol is ZK, we provide the following simulator:
1. Run simulate to generate R, and compute I accordingly.
Choose (z
, 1}, and send it to the verifier along with R. 3. Get b from the verifier. 4. If b =b, the simulator sends back (z S , z pk ). Otherwise, it goes to Step 2 (rewinds the verifier).
The prover's first message in the protocol is the value of F on a random point (S ′ , pk ′ ) ∈ G S × G pk and so is the simulator's. Moreover, the distributions of the responses of the prover and of the simulator are again identical. Finally, we observe that the simulator runs in expected time 2 ℓ since the probability of not rewinding the verifier is:
Adjusting ℓ to a factor logarithmic in the security parameter ensures that the simulator will run in expected polynomial time.
⊓ ⊔ E.2 The Class E 1 of TBE Fact 2 The scheme described in Figure 3 belongs to the class E 1 .
Proof. 1. The message space is G and the key space is G 4 . 2. Given a message m and its encryption e = (e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , e 4 ) w.r.t. a key pk and a tag t, one can efficiently prove knowledge of this statement using the randomness used to produce c; the proof of equality of discrete logarithms. 3. Given a ciphertext e = (e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , e 4 ) produced on some message w under some key pk w.r.t. a given tag t:
and some random message m
It is easy to see that both pk ′ and w ′ are random. 4. Moreover the set E = {e ′ : (pk ′ , w ′ , e ′ ) ← Γ.compute(e)} is obviously equal to {c 1 } × G 3 , on which we define the following operation • e :
E is naturally a group operation w.r.t.
• e with identity (c 1 , 
2 ) w.r.t. the same tag t. Finally, the randomness used to produce e is the same used to produce e ′ and e ′′ . ⊓ ⊔ 
Common input: (e 1 , t, f, x) and Private input: (w, pk) and randomness used to produce e 1 .
Remark 4. The presence of the map F in Figure 8 is needed to bind the public key underlying the encryption e 1 to a specific value. Presence of the relation R adds a further constraint on the decryption of e 1 . Proof. We first note that 1 E = Γ 1 .encrypt 1 G pk (1 G w , t) (E is the set underlying Γ 1 , see Definition 3), and
Completeness is straightforward. For the SpS property, we assume that we have for the same commitment (e
) two accepting answers (z pk , z w ) and (z pk , z w ) (along with the corresponding proofs PoK and PoK)
for two different challenges b and b respectively. We have thereby:
• e e b 1 = Γ 1 .encrypt z pk (z w , t) and e ′ 1
• e e b 1 = Γ 1 .encrypt z pk (z w , t), provided both PoK and PoK are sound.
, and
For the zero-knowledgeness, we describe the following simulator:
1. Generate uniformly a random challengeb
• e e −b 1 , f ′′ = F(z pk ), and f
) to the verifier. 2. Get b from the verifier. 3. If b =b, the simulator sends back (z pk , z w ), and simulates the proof PoK for e ′′ 1 being the encryption of z w under z pk w.r.t. the tag t (the proof is simulatable since it is zero knowledge by assumption). Otherwise, it goes to Step 2 (rewinds the verifier).
The prover's first message is always an encryption of a random message w ′ w.r.t. t under a random public key pk ′ in addition to the value of F on pk ′ , and the value of F R on w ′ . The simulator's first message is also an encryption of a random message z w * w w −b w.r.t. t under a random public key z pk * pk pk −b , the value of the function F on the same key, and the value of F R on the same random message. Sinceb is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} ℓ , then the probability that the simulator does not rewind the verifier is 2 −ℓ , and thus the simulator runs in expected polynomial time if ℓ is logarithmic in the security parameter. Finally, the distributions of the answers of the prover and of the simulator are the same (both answers comprise random values (z pk , z w ) in G pk × G w and a proof that z w is the decryption of e ′ 1
• e eˆb 1 w.r.t. t under the key z pk ). We conclude that above proof is zero knowledge.
⊓ ⊔
E.3 Instantiation of the class H
Let (G, ·) be a group, denoted multiplicatively, with prime order d. Let further a 1 , . . . , a n be elements in Z d , where n is some integer. We consider the following map:
It is easy to see that G n is a group where the group operation, say ⊙, is the component-wise product. Moreover for every (X 1 , . . . , X n ) and (X ′ 1 , . . . , X ′ n ) in G n , we have:
Let pk = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) ∈ G n be a public key from database. We assume that X i = g
, i = 1 . . . n, where the g i 's are known generators of G and (x 1 , . . . , x n ) denotes the private key sk corresponding to pk. Let further g be a known generator of G. We denote by log g g i the discrete logarithm of g i in base g.
Let E denote the event that corresponds to having two different pk and pk ′ that map to the same value by H. Occurrence of the event E translates in having the multivariate polynomial (defined over Z d ): Pr
⊓ ⊔
To force the private keys sk to be random, GM can proceed to a systematic randomization of the corresponding pk as follows: upon receipt of pk = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) from the group member, GM computes the new key as
. The corresponding private key can be computed once GM publishes the vector r. 
E.4 The Class E 2 of TBE
and PoK is valid. Fig. 9 . Proof system for membership to the language {(h, pk) : Figure 9 is a zero knowledge proof of knowledge, with the SpS property.
Proof. To prove this theorem, we first remark that the encrypt algorithm, with respect to a given public key pk, induces a group law on the ciphertext space C.
Completeness is straightforward. For the SpS property, we assume that we have for the same commitment e The distribution of the messages of the prover and of the simulator is the same. Moreover, the probability that the simulator does not rewind the verifier is 2 −ℓ , sinceb is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} ℓ . We conclude then that above proof is perfectly zero knowledge as the simulator runs in expected polynomial time if ℓ is logarithmic in the security parameter.
E.5 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. The protocol depicted in Figure 2 is a parallel composition of the protocols given in Figures 7 & 8 & 9 . Therefore, completeness and the SpS property follow in straightforward way. Likewise, the ZK knowledge simulator of the protocol is a parallel composition of the ZK simulators of the mentioned protocols, which concludes the proof. ⊓ ⊔
E.6 Proof of Theorem 4
We first note the following remark.
Remark 5.
If the function F is not second-preimage resistant, i.e. given (S, pk), then one can find a different pair ( S, pk) such that F( S, pk) = F(S, pk), then one can existentially forge certificates given any valid certificate and corresponding key. In fact, the adversary can compute from the valid certificate, say cert pk and key pk the tuple (S, R) such that F(S, pk) = g(cpk, R). Then call the retrieve algorithm on ( S, pk, R) in order to compute a certificate cert pk on pk.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of [23, Theorem 3 .1] except that we use in our case the SpS property of prove instead of the extractability and binding property of the commitment. Let A be a soundness adversary against the construction. We build an adversary R against the signature scheme underlying the construction as follows. R gets the signature scheme public parameters, generates further the remaining parameters for the construction, and finally submits these to A. R further uses her signing oracle in order to issue valid certificates on the public keys presented by A.
Due to the SpS property (which implies soundness) of prove, the only possibility for A is to successfully carry out prove for pk database. R can then use the knowledge extractor (described in the proof of Theorem 5) in order to extract a pair ( S, pk) satisfying F( S, pk) = F(S, pk) = I. If pk pk, then according to Remark 5, we can build an EUF-CMA forger against the construction, otherwise we call retrieve on (S, R, pk) in order to extract the certificate, say cert pk , on pk. Since pk database, then R never requested his challenger for a signature on pk and thus (cert pk , pk) forms a valid existential forgery on the signature scheme. Figure 3 
F Security Analysis of the Encryption Scheme in
F.1 The Twin Diffie-Hellman problem
The Twin Diffie-Hellman problem was introduced in [11] as a slight modification to the original DiffieHellman (DH) problem which is as hard as the ordinary DH problem, even given access to a corresponding decision oracle. It is defined as follows.
Let G be a prime-order cyclic group generated by some g. Let further dh further denotes the DiffieHellman function (it inputs (X, Y) ∈ G 2 and returns Z such that (g, X, Y, Z) is Diffie-Hellman quadruple). The Twin DH function is defined as follows 2dh :
Cash et al. define further a corresponding twin DH predicate:
Finally the Strong Twin Diffie-Hellman assumption states that distinguishing the two distributions (
hard even in the presence of a decision oracle for the predicate 2dhp(X 1 , X 2 , −, −, −) which on input (Ŷ,Ẑ 1 ,Ẑ 2 )) returns 2dhp(X 1 , X 2 ,Ŷ,Ẑ 1 ,Ẑ 2 ).
Theorem 8. The DDH assumption holds if and only if the Strong Twin DDH assumptions holds.
The proof is given in [11] . Then the probability that the output of Game 3 equals zero is exactly 1 2 . ⊓ ⊔
F.3 Anonymity
Here, we extend the result of [22, 15] which derives anonymity from indistinguishability in public key encryption schemes, to tag-based encryption schemes. Let Γ be a tag-based encryption scheme given by the three algorithms Γ.keygen, Γ.encrypt, and Γ.decrypt. Let further M and C denote the message and ciphertext space of Γ respectively. We stress that C depends solely on the considered security parameter and not on a particular key. We consider the following property:
Property A Let κ be a security parameter. Let further t be a fixed tag, and (pk, sk) be an output of Γ.keygen. Consider the uniform distribution on M. Then, the distribution on C corresponding to the random variable It is clear that the scheme in Figure 3 satisfies easily Property A as a for a fixed key (X 1 , X 1 , X 2 , X 2 ) and a fixed tag the encryption of a random message m is a random ciphertext (g r , (X Proof. We proceed in this proof using the game-hopping technique which considers a sequence of games; the first one mirrors that of an anonymity adversary whereas the last one corresponds to the standard indistinguishability game. We denote by S i the event that Game i returns 1.
Game 0 . We consider the standard game played with a (t, ǫ, q d )-ANO-st-wCCA attacker A. communication cost amounts to 30 group elements in addition to 3ℓ, where 2 −ℓ is the soundness error, say 1 kB if we use a 256-bit group size and we consider a soundness error of 2 −50 . This is again significantly smaller than 16.125 kB required for [12] (using the same group order bit-size) or 70 kB required for [23] (achieving the same soundness error). 
Non-interactive proof
e(P, m) = x
The equations involve 11 variables (z, r ′ , u ′ , X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 , k, h, ℓ, m)and thus will increase the size of the proof by 22 group elements. Equations (1) and (2) costs two group elements each (linear pairing equation). Equation (3) comprises four sub-equations; the first three cost one group element each (linear equation) and the last one costs 6 group elements (multi-exponentiation equation). Equation (4) costs 6 group elements (multi-exponentiation equation). Equation (5) comprises four sub-equations, the first one costs 1 group element, and the last three ones cost 6 elements each. Finally Equation (6) costs 2 group elements. The overall size of prove amounts then to 22 + 2 + 2 + 3 + 6 + 6 + 1 + 3 · 6 + 2 = 62 group elements, say 2 kB versus 16.125 kB [12] (using the same group order bit-size, namely 256-bit size).
The verification cost in terms of pairing computations is computed as follows. Equation (1) costs 5 · 0 + 3 · 6 + 16 = 34 pairings. Equation (2) costs similarly 34 pairings. Equation (3) comprises four sub-equations: the first three ones need 8 · 0 + 2 · 1 + 14 = 16 pairings each; the last sub-equation demands 8 · 1 + 2 · 1 + 14 = 24; so to say Equation (3) needs 3 · 16 + 24 = 72 pairings. Equation (4) needs 8 · 5 + 2 · 0 + 14 = 54 pairings. Equation (5) comprises four sub-equations; the first one needs 2 + 14 = 16 pairings and the last three costs 8 · 2 + 2 · 1 + 14 = 32 pairings each. Finally Equation (6) · D i,1 · D i,2 , f )e( f 3,3 , D i,3 ) 
e(X, Y) = e(g, W)
Equation (1) comprises 6 sub-equations, each involves 3 variables, thus it requires 6(12 · 3 + 27) = 378 pairingd. Similarly equation (2) requires 378 pairings. Equation (3) contains 6 sub-equations each involves 5 variables thus it requires 6(12 · 5 + 27) = 522 pairings. Equations (4) and (5) both involve two variables and thus require 12 · 2 + 27 = 51 pairings each. Equation (6) involves 20 variables and thus requires 12·20+27 = 267 pairings. Equation (7) comprise 18 sub-equations, each involves 3 variables, thus the equation needs 18(12 ·3 + 27) = 1134. Equation (8) comprises 6 sub-equations, each sub-equation comprises itself three sub-equations, where the first two involve one variable (the exponent) thus require 9 · 1 + 12 · 0 + 27 = 36 pairings each, whereas the third one comprise two variables (one exponent and one group element) thus needs 9 · 2 + 12 · 1 + 27 = 57. Thus Equation (8) requires 6(36 + 36 + 57) = 774. Equation (9) comprises five sub-equations: the first two involves one variable each and thus require 9·1+12·0+27 = 36 pairings each; the third one involves two variables and thus requires 9·2+12·0+27 = 45; the fourth one involves two exponent variables and three group element variables thus needs 9 · 2 + 12 · 3 + 27 = 81; finally the fifth sub-equation involves two exponent variables and four group elements variables thus needs 9 · 2 + 12 · 4 + 27 = 93. Thus equation (9) needs 291 pairings. Finally equation (10) involves one variable and thus requires 12 · 1 + 27 = 49 pairings.
The overall prove requires then 3895 pairing computations.
